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THE NEED TO CONSIDER CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN
BIOLOGICAL PARENT V. THIRD PARTY
CUSTODY DISPUTES
JAMES G. O'KEEFE*
INTRODUCTION
In 1940, Dr. Seuss, author of children's stories, published a book'
about a kindly elephant, Horton, and "a lazy bird,"' 2 Mayzie. Mayzie is
up a tree, sitting on an egg and definitely not liking it, because "It's
work' 3 and she would rather play. Mayzie decides that she wants to be
free and take a vacation. Horton the elephant passes by the tree where
Mayzie is sitting on her egg. Mayzie cajoles, flatters and pleads and
eventually gets Horton to agree to sit on the egg while Mayzie takes a
brief rest. She promises to hurry back but instead goes to Palm Beach for
an extended vacation. She has so much fun in Florida that she decides
never to return to her nest. Meanwhile, Horton faithfully sits on the
nest, through the cold and wet of thunderstorms, through the freezing
snow and sleet of winter and despite the ridicule of his friends who go off
to play without him. Through all of the adversity Horton remembers his
promise to Mayzie to sit on the egg and protect it, saying to himself, "I
meant what I said [a]nd I said what I meant .... An elephant's faithful
[olne hundred per cent!' 4 Even when faced with the guns of hunters,
Horton steadfastly maintains his position on the egg. The hunters sell
Horton, the tree and the egg to a circus and Horton is put on public
display. But he never leaves the egg. After Horton has been sitting on
the egg for fifty-one weeks, Mayzie, still on vacation, decides to visit the
circus and runs into Horton. During their unexpected meeting, the egg
begins to hatch. Mayzie starts screaming that the egg is hers. "The work
was all done. Now she wanted it back."'5 Horton sadly backs down off
of the tree. Well, when the egg hatches, what emerges is a tiny, baby
elephant with wings.
* I wish to express my appreciation to Associate Professor John Hill of Western State Univer-
sity College of Law without whose guidance this Note would not have been possible. I also wish to
thank Jackie for her invaluable support and Kevin for his patience and understanding.
1. DR. SEUSS, HORTON HATCHES THE EGG (1940).
2. Id. This book has no page numbers.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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In Dr. Seuss' story it is clear that the baby elephant and Horton
belong together. Horton has put in the time, the energy and the caring
which might be expected from a parent. The little animal that emerges
from the egg demonstrates, through its own form, that it has responded
to Horton's parental attention and has become Horton's child. A parent-
child relationship has developed and Horton is obviously more the par-
ent of the little elephant with wings than is Mayzie the bird. In the story,
Horton and the baby are sent home to the jungle together, happy. It
would be a rare person who would not have a sense of rightness about
this ending. However, courts in many jurisdictions of this country would
have given the baby to Mayzie.
In late 1988, a situation in Florida attracted national attention.6
Kimberly Mays, a ten-year-old girl, had been raised since birth by Rob-
ert Mays. Barbara Mays, Robert's wife and Kimberly's mother, had died
of cancer in 1981. Another couple, Ernest and Regina Twigg, also raised
a ten-year-old daughter, Arlena. In 1988, Arlena died of a congenital
heart defect. Blood tests prior to Arlena's death revealed that Arlena
was not the biological daughter of the Twiggs. Because the only other
caucasian baby born in Hardee Memorial Hospital at the time of
Arlena's birth was Kimberly Mays, the Twiggs initiated legal action to
have blood tests done on Kimberly to determine if she was in fact their
biological child. Throughout a year of legal battle, Robert Mays resisted
the efforts of the Twiggs. Finally, after Ernest and Regina agreed not to
seek custody, Mr. Mays agreed to the blood tests which, in fact, showed
to a 99.999% certainty that Kimberly was the Twiggs' biological daugh-
ter. Kimberly's initial reaction upon hearing the results was "Oh Daddy,
I don't want to go."' 7 The Twiggs have kept to their agreement and have
not sought custody. With the help of mental health professionals, visita-
tion arrangements are being negotiated. Robert and Kimberly over a ten
year period had lived as father and daughter and felt about each other as
a father and daughter feel about each other. For ten years, Robert Mays
cared for Kimberly as a parent, for example, enduring the anxiety and
sleepless nights of a parent, devoting the time, energy and financial re-
sources a parent would devote to his child. Cognitively and emotionally,
Kimberly perceived Robert as her father. In her reality, he was her fa-
ther. Robert was the only father Kimberly ever knew. Yet, in many
jurisdictions of this country the Twiggs, as Kimberly's biological parents,
would have an excellent chance of obtaining custody.
6. Michelle Green et al., Every Parent's Nightmare: A Hospital Nursery Swap Throws Two
Florida Families Into Disarray, PEOPLE, Dec. 11, 1989, at 77.
7. Id.
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In a series of articles, 8 the Chicago Tribune reported the true story
of a girl referred to as "Sarah." 9 Sarah had been born on April 27, 1984,
of a heroin-addicted mother who abandoned her at the hospital. 10 Sa-
rah's mother had reportedly never seen a doctor throughout the preg-
nancy.II Because of the mother's drug abuse during the pregnancy,
Sarah was also addicted to heroin and went through withdrawal after
birth. 12 Shortly after birth, Sarah was put into the care of Joseph and
Marge Procopio. The couple raised Sarah until the biological mother
resurfaced, reportedly off drugs and demanding the return of her child. 13
On August 29, 1989, when Sarah was age five, "begging not to be
taken from the house,"'14 she was given, by order of the juvenile court, to
the custody of the biological mother and the mother's boyfriend. Dr.
David Zinn, a psychiatrist with Northwestern Memorial Hospital, had
evaluated Sarah prior to the custody change and had recommended
against it, '5 but his recommendation was not followed by the judge.' 6
Dr. Bennett Leventhal of the University of Chicago evaluated Sarah after
8. Rob Karwath, Judge Heads 'Sarah.- Rules for Her Parents, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 9, 1991
(News), at 1; Rob Karwath, Keep 'Sarah' With Parents, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 8, 1991 (Chicagoland), at 1;
Rob Karwath, 'Sarah' Case Judge Will Need Wisdom of Solomon to Rule, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1991
(Chicagoland), at 1; Rob Karwath, 'Sarah' Case Judge: Let Me Live With My Parents, CI. TRIB.,
Oct. 5, 1991 (News), at 1; Rob Karwath, Ex-Foster Father Disputes Risks of Regaining Custody of
Sarah, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 3, 1991 (Chicagoland), at 5; Rob Karwath, Doctor Calls Mother of 'Sarah'
Fit, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 1991 (Chicagoland), at 4; Rob Karwath, New Custody Battle Begins for
'Sarah,' CI. TRIB., Sept. 20, 1991 (Chicagoland), at 2; Rob Karwath, 'Sarah's' Former Foster Par-
ents File Papers to Regain Custody, Ca. TRIB., Aug. 14, 1991 (Chicagoland), at 4; Rob Karwath,
'Sarah' Judge is OffAbuse Cases, CII. TRIB., Aug. 6, 1991 (Chicagoland), at 4; Bob Greene, A Single
Word That Sarah Needs to Hear, CI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 1991 (Tempo), at 1; Bob Greene, For Sarah,
the Final Chapter Begins, CHII. TRIB., Sept. 15, 1991 (Tempo), at 1; Bob Greene, Sarah Gets Her Visit
Then Doors Close, CHII. TRIB., Aug. 4, 1991 (Tempo), at 1; Bob Greene, How the Judge Quit on
Sarah, CHI. TRIB., June 23, 1991 (Tempo), at 1; Bob Greene, Sarah Wins: Justice at Last, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 21, 1991 (Tempo), at 1; Bob Greene, 'I Believe the Judge Was Wrong,' CHI. TRIB., Dec.
3, 1990 (Tempo), at 1; Bob Greene, Judge Bars Sarah From Seeing Her Lost Family, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 30, 1990 (Tempo), at 1; Bob Greene, Doctor's Rx for Sarah: Visiting Her Lost Family, CH I.
TRIB., Nov. 18, 1990 (Tempo), at 1; Bob Greene, Red Tape Tangles Sarah's Case Again, CI. TRIB.,
Sept. 23, 1990 (Tempo), at 1; Bob Greene, Finally, a Victory for Sarah, CI. TRm., July 29, 1990
(Tempo), at 1; Bob Greene, Sarah's Future in Judge's Hands, CI. TRIB., July 15, 1990 (Tempo), at
1; Bob Greene, Help, Hope May Be Too Late for Sarah, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 1990 (Tempo), at 1;
Bob Greene, Defenseless, Sarah Has Learned to Hate, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1990 (Tempo), at 1; Bob
Greene, Thompson: Time to Hear From Sarah, CI. TRIB., May 20, 1990 (Tempo), at 1; Bob
Greene, Thompson Steps in on Sarah's Case, CHI. TRIB., May 6, 1990 (Tempo), at 1; Bob Greene,
State Orders Grief for a Little Girl, CI. TRIB., Apr. 29, 1990 (Tempo), at 1.
9. Bob Greene, State Orders Grief for a Little Girl, CI. TRIB., Apr. 29, 1990 (Tempo), at 1.
10. Bob Greene, Thompson Steps in on Sarah's Case, CI. TRIB., May 6, 1990 (Tempo), at 1.
11. Greene, supra note 9, at 1.
12. Id.
13. Bob Greene, I Believe Judge Was Wrong, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 3, 1990 (Tempo), at 1.
14. Id.
15. Bob Greene, Judge Bars Sarah From Seeing Her Lost Family, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 30, 1990
(Tempo), at 1.
16. Juvenile Court Judge Walter Williams. Id.
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the custody change and recommended that visitation with the Procopios
be arranged, but the judge did not follow these recommendations.' 7 Sa-
rah was taken from her home and handed over to her biological mother.
Because the biological mother had "physically given birth, she was con-
sidered to be Sarah's family." 8 Dr. Zinn referred to the custody change
under these conditions as "state-sanctioned child abuse"' 9 which will
cause "irreparable harm."' 20  He further stated that Sarah has exper-
ienced the change of custody as the "death of the only parents she had
ever known."' 21 Ultimately, the result was that a child was separated
from those people she perceived to be her parents and given to a woman
whom the state said is her mother because of a biological connection, but
whom she essentially did not know.22
The Illinois Appellate Court 23 reviewed the decision made in the
case of Sarah and vigorously criticized the decision of Juvenile Court
Judge Walter Williams to attempt to balance the best interests of the
child with the rights of the biological parents. Justice Rizzi pointed out
that the sole standard which should be used in Illinois is the best interest
of the child standard. 24 The Appellate Court reversed and remanded so
that the Juvenile Court might decide the case accordingly. 25 Sarah, how-
ever, had been in the custody of her natural parents for two years since
she was taken from the custody of the Procopios. Two psychiatrists, Dr.
Larry Feldman and Dr. Bennett Leventhal, stated that they believed that
at this time, it would be contrary to the child's best interest to be re-
moved from her home for a second time.26 Juvenile Court Judge Robert
Smierciak therefore ordered that the natural parents retain custody. 27
17. Id.
18. Bob Greene, Doctor's Rx for Sarah: Visiting Her Lost Family, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 1990
(Tempo), at 1.
19. Bob Greene, Thompson: Time to Hear From Sarah, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 1990 (Tempo), at
1.
20. Bob Greene, Finally, a Victory for Sarah, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 1990 (Tempo), at 1.
21. Id.
22. Greene, supra note 15, at 1. With publication of this case, Governor Thompson introduced
legislation into the State Assembly to make it "easier to remove parental rights from unfit men and
women." Bob Greene, Help, Hope May Be Too Late for Sarah, CHI. TRIR., June 24, 1990 (Tempo),
at 1.
23. In the Interest of Ashley K., 571 N.E.2d 905, appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 115 (Il1. App. Ct.
1991).
24. Id. at 923.
25. Id. at 930.
26. Rob Karwath, Keep 'Sarah' With Parents, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 8, 1991 (Chicagoland), at 1.
27. Rob Karwath, Judge Heeds 'Sarah'. Rules For Her Parents, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 9, 1991
(News), at I. Illinois is generally considered a jurisdiction which will apply the best interests of the
child standard in biological parent vs. third party custody disputes. See infra notes 97-103 and
accompanying text. Even in Illinois, however, the type of situation which arose in the "Sarah" case
is not unique. See, e.g., In re Violetta B., 568 N.E.2d 1345 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). In this case, the trial
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In custody disputes between biological parents and third parties,
several jurisdictions apply the doctrine of parental rights, 28 that is, unless
the natural parent can be shown to be an unfit parent, the natural parent
has a right to have custody of the child over any third party. In these
jurisdictions, factors regarding the best interest of the child, including
consideration of the question of who is the psychological parent 29 of the
child, are not addressed until the natural parent can be proven to be
unfit.
This Note will argue that use of the parental rights doctrine as a
standard in deciding child custody is no longer realistic. Part I will look
at the history of the relationship between parental rights and children's
rights and the emergence of the perception that constitutional protection
extends into the family system. Part II will examine, in more detail, the
best interest standard and the parental rights doctrine as applied in bio-
logical parent vs. third party custody disputes. 30 Part III will address
recent Supreme Court decisions in family law and scientific advances in
the area of human reproduction which indicate that the definition of
parenthood in strictly biological terms is no longer feasible. Part IV will
discuss developmental psychology, particularly attachment theory.3' Us-
ing principles from attachment theory, this Note will then argue that the
best interests of the child are most likely to be served if recognition is
given to the child's need to maintain the relationship with that individual
the child perceives, on a psychological and emotional level, to be his or
her parent. Further, given the seriousness of the likely harm to the child,
court had removed a four-year-old child from the home of a foster parent with whom the child had
lived since she was four months old and gave custody to the natural grandmother. The trial court
did not give weight to the testimony of three mental health professionals who testified that it would
be in the best interest of the child to remain with the foster parent. The trial court said that the
emotional bonding between the child and foster mother would not have occurred except for the
misconduct of DCFS. Id. at 1352. The appellate court reversed on best interest grounds, taking into
account the testimony of the three mental health workers. Id. at 1352-54. The dissent, however,
argued for affirming the decision of the trial court in order to promote the goal of reunification of the
natural family, which, the dissent seems to state, would in itself be in the child's best interest. Id. at
1354-59.
28. See generally Suzette M. Haynie, Note, Biological Parents v. Third Parties: Whose Right to
Child Custody Is Constitutionally Protected?, 20 GA. L. REV. 705 (1986); Gregory S. Hilderbran,
Note, In Re Baby Girl Eason: Balancing Three Competing Interests in Third Party Adoptions, 22
GA. L. REV. 1217 (1988); Stephanie H. Smith, Note, Psychological Parents vs. Biological Parents:
The Courts' Response to New Direction In Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 J. FAM. L. 545
(1978-79).
29. See generally Haynie supra note 28; Hilderbran, supra note 28; Smith, supra note 28.
30. There are a number of ways that custody disputes between biological parents and third
parties can arise. For purposes of this Note, I will concentrate on those situations where the child
has been in the physical custody of the third party for a period of time sufficient for an emotional
connection in the form of a parent-child relationship to develop.
31. See generally I JOHN BOWLBY, ATrACHMENT AND Loss (1969); 2 JOHN BOWLBY, AT-
TACHMENT AND Loss (1973); 3 JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss (1980).
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this Note will argue that it is inconceivable not to consider the child's
best interest when giving priority to parental rights means removing the
child from the custody of the child's psychological parents.
I. HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PARENT'S RIGHTS AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
The relationship between the rights of the parent and the rights of
the child has been anything but stable. The idea of children having
rights, or for that matter being anything but property, is a relatively re-
cent development legally. In early Roman law, the father had complete
control over his children. They were his to do with as he pleased,
whether that meant selling them or putting them to death. 32 In tenth
century England, a parent could kill an unweaned child or sell a child
under the age of seven into slavery. 33 One commentator has divided the
history of how the law has treated children during the past four hundred
years into four eras: the early 1600s to the early 1800s; the early 1800s to
the mid-1800s; the late 1800s to 1967; and 1967 to present. 34 The first
era, early 1600s to early 1800s, was a period when children were consid-
ered essentially property of parents, particularly their father. In the sev-
enteenth century, a father could not legally murder his children but he
could still sell custody of his children without interference by the govern-
ment. Further, the parent could not be prosecuted for neglect unless the
child was incapacitated due to "infancy, disease or accident."' 35 The
Massachusetts Stubborn Child Law has been frequently used as a prime
example of parents' almost total authority over their children during the
seventeenth century.36
If a man have a stubborn or rebellious son, of sufficient years and un-
derstanding (viz.) sixteen years of age, which will not obey the voice of
his Father, or the voice of his Mother, and that when they have chas-
tened him will not harken unto them: then shall his Father and
Mother being his natural parents, lay hold on him, and bring him to
the Magistrates assembled in Court and testify unto them, that their
son is stubborn and rebellious and will not obey their voice and chas-
tisement, but lives in sundry notorious crimes, such a son shall be put
32. Allan Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L. 425-26
(1976-77); Paul Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW 588,
609 (1950).
33. Lucy S. McGough & Lawrence M. Shindell, Coming ofAge: The Best Interests of the Child
Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209, 209 (1978).
34. Robert M. Horowitz & Howard A. Davidson, Children's Rights: A Look Backward and a
Glance Ahead, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 1, 2-3 (1984).
35. McGough & Shindell, supra note 33, at 210.
36. Horowitz & Davidson, supra note 34, at 3.
[Vol. 67:1077
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to death. 37
Until the nineteenth century, the family was the central unit of soci-
ety. The family, in an agrarian, land-oriented culture, was the primary
provider for emotional, physical, economic, social, religious, and educa-
tional needs. Historically, the family in America was a patriarchy.3 8
The father of the family was essentially the ruler of the family, organiz-
ing the family's activities, settling disputes, and taking responsibility for
the welfare of the family. The mother and children were to serve the
father in preserving the welfare of the family. 39
The beginning of the nineteenth century marks the beginning of the
second era.4° The Industrial Revolution began at this time and, with it, a
de-emphasis of the family. Cities grew and with them, factories. The
family became less and less the self-contained unit than it had been as
men moved out of the home to find work.41 The role of the family began
to change from that of primary economic provider to the locus of child-
rearing. The father began to be seen as less the owner of property and
lord of the family unit and more as guardian of the children.4 2 Coupled
with this change in perception of the family was the rise of the women's
rights movement, as evidenced by the first women's rights convention,
held in 1848. 43 Gradually, there came to be a change in perception re-
garding children, from seeing them as instruments to be used, primarily
by the father, for the welfare or survival of the family to viewing them as
beings requiring nurturing and protection. The women's rights move-
ment fostered this perception as well as the perception of the mother as
the primary source of nurturing in the home while the father was the
economic provider, working outside the home. As the nineteenth cen-
tury progressed, there emerged an increasing societal concern regarding
the welfare of children. Social reformers voiced concern about the detri-
mental effects of urban living on children." In Ex parte Crouse, a court
for the first time referred to the state's parens patriae right to protect
37. John R. Sutton, Stubborn Children: Law and the Socialization of Deviance in the Puritan
Colonies, 15 FAM. L.Q. 31 (1981).
38. PAUL B. HORTON & CHESTER L. HUNT, SOCIOLOGY 225 (1964).
39. William F. Ogburn, The Family and Its Functions, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW,
supra note 32, at 20-21 (1950); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE
FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 235-37 (1985).
40. Horowitz & Davidson, supra note 34, at 3.
41. Id.
42. See generally GROSSBERG, supra note 39; Ogburn, supra note 39, at 22.
43. GROSSBERG, supra note 39, at 244.
44. Horowitz & Davidson, supra note 34, at 3; Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Profes-
sional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 737
(1988).
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children.45 In 1874, a woman was prosecuted and convicted in New
York for physical abuse of her daughter.46 However, because there were
no child abuse laws at that time, the prosecution was carried out with
reference to the local anti-cruelty-to-animals statutes.47 Changes were
being made in assumptions regarding custody. Prior to the nineteenth
century, the father was seen as having custody of his children over the
mother's interests, to the point of the father being able in his will to ap-
point a guardian for his children other than the mother.48 With the in-
creased emphasis on child nurturing in the family, the rise of the
women's movement and the perception of the mother as the nurturing
parent, the paternal presumption of custody lost ground.49 Increasingly
after the mid-nineteenth century, there arose a maternal preference in
custody disputes between a mother and a father.50 In fact, later in the
nineteenth century, the tender years doctrine was developed, the "pre-
sumption that the welfare of a child of tender years is normally best pro-
tected by placing it in the mother's custody." 51
Coming out of the nineteenth century's concern for the welfare of
children, the best interests of the child standard for deciding custody dis-
putes between parents saw its beginnings in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. 52 Some commentators have proposed that the use of
the best interest standard is actually simply a result of the court acting in
its parens patriae role, deciding what is best for the child independent of
the wishes of the parents. 53 The determination of the best interests of the
child is done by the court through a consideration of relevant factors.
The factors looked at tend to include the desires of the child's parents;
45. Horowitz & Davidson, supra note 34 at 3 (citing 4 Whart. 9 (1838)).
46. McGough & Shindell, supra note 33, at 210.
47. Id.
48. GROSSBERG, supra note 39, at 243.
49. Id. at 244-47.
50. Interestingly, one of the first cases, in English law to limit the custody rights of the father,
Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (1817), involved the poet Percy Bysshe Shelley. When
Shelley left his wife to run away with Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin, the author of Frankenstein, his
wife killed herself. When Shelley attempted to get custody of his two children, the court refused to
permit him to do so, referring to his immoral lifestyle. See Frank La Budde, Recent Decisions-
Family Law-Child Custody-Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Cases Held Unconstitu-
tional Gender-Based Discrimination. Ex Pane Devine, 398 So.2d 686 (Ala. 1981), 12 CUMB. L. REV.
513, 516 (1982).
51. Howard A. Davidson & Katherine Gerlach, Child Custody Disputes: The Child's Perspec-
tive, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 34 at 232, 235.
52. Davidson & Gerlach, supra note 51, at 236-37.
53. Davidson & Gerlach, supra note 51, at 237. See, Note, Developments in the Law-The
Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1221-42 (1980) [hereinafter The Constitution
and the Family], for a history of the parens patriae doctrine, its developing relation to parental rights
and to children's rights and a discussion of possible constitutional limitations on the state's parens
patriae role. See also GROSSBERG, supra note 39, at 236-37.
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the child's preferences; the child's needs, including those related to spe-
cial mental or physical conditions; the child's sex and age; and each par-
ent's respective fitness to care for the child.54 Historically, courts have
looked at each parent's moral rectitude in assessing parental fitness, but
more recently have tended to regard only those qualities of the parent
which may positively or adversely affect the child.55 Although there are
some recognized difficulties in implementation of the best interest stan-
dard, it is the currently accepted standard for resolution of custody dis-
putes between natural parents. 56
The beginning of the third era of development in the rights of chil-
dren is marked with the establishment of the first statewide juvenile court
system, in Illinois, in 1899.57 By mid-century, all but two states had es-
tablished state juvenile court systems. 58  The juvenile court system
brought the state's parens patriae role into full blossom. The court was
seen as a "compassionate parent figure."' 59 Children were not yet per-
ceived as having legal rights. 60
In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has, in a series of cases,
affirmed fundamental rights regarding families and parenthood. In Lov-
ing v. Virginia, 61 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
Virginia miscegenation statute which made it illegal for individuals of
different races to marry. The Court, in finding the statute unconstitu-
tional and in affirming the right to marry, stated "[t]he freedom to marry
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. ' ' 62 The Court referred to
the right to marry as a "fundamental freedom. '63  In Zablochi v.
Redhail,64 the Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin statute which
essentially made it illegal for an individual to marry who was behind in
child support payments. The Supreme Court referred to the right to
54. Davidson & Gerlach, supra note 51, at 237-38. See also 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and
Separation § 974 (1983).
55. Davidson & Gerlach, supra note 51, at 237.
56. For a discussion of the issues and difficulties in implementation of the best interest stan-
dards, see generally Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face
of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 236 (1975). Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650
(1881), is generally cited as one of the early cases which used the best interest of the child standard.
See Davidson & Gerlach, supra note 51, at 237; Sayre, supra note 32, at 592.
57. Horowitz, supra note 34, at 4.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
62. Id. at 12.
63. Id.
64. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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marry as one of "fundamental importance" 65 and specifically stated that
it was "reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry."166
The idea that parenthood is worthy of constitutional protection 67 is seen
as having its beginnings in the cases of Meyer v. Nebraska 68 and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters.69 In Meyer, the Supreme Court held that among the
liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is the right "to
marry, establish a home and bring up children."'70 The Supreme Court
in Pierce invalidated an Oregon statute which mandated that all children
attend public schools holding that the statute unreasonably invaded a
constitutionally protected liberty interest of parents.7' Nineteen years af-
ter the Supreme Court issued the Pierce decision, it decided the case of
Prince v. Massachusetts.72 In this case the Court clearly stated that it
recognized a "private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter."'73 The Prince court, however, also clearly stated that the privacy
right of the family is not absolute: "[but] the family itself is not beyond
regulation in the public interest."' 74 The Court stated that the state has a
right to regulate the family in certain ways to provide needed protection
for the child and for society. 75 Justice Rutledge powerfully summed up
this aspect of the opinion of the Court as follows: "Parents may be free
to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they are free,
in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they
have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that
choice for themselves."' 76 In 1974, the Supreme Court in Cleveland
65. Id. at 383.
66. Id. at 386.
67. Francis B. McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental Rights,
22 GA. L. REV. 975, 986 (1988). See also The Constitution and the Family, supra note 53, at 1162.
68. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Nebraska statute
which prohibited the teaching of subjects in foreign languages and the teaching of foreign language
prior to eighth grade. The Court held that this statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interests of parents.
69. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Pierce, the Supreme Court held as unconstitutional an Oregon
statute mandating that all children attend public schools, again stating that the statute violated
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests of parents.
70. 262 U.S. at 399.
71. 268 U.S. at 534-35.
72. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). In Prince, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a woman who
allowed minors to distribute religious materials on a public street in violation of Massachusetts child
labor laws. Id. at 171. The Prince Court makes strong statements in support of the rights of parents
to control the raising of their children but also clearly indicates that parental rights are not absolute.
Id. at 166.
73. Id. at 166.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 166-67. The Court gave as examples the State's right to require school attendance,
regulate child labor, prohibit the parent from exposing the "community or the child" to disease.
76. Id. at 170.
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Board of Educators v. LaFleur77 held as unconstitutional mandatory un-
paid maternity leave for public school teachers. In finding a violation of
constitutionally protected due process, the Court said, "This Court has
long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 78
The twentieth century has also seen the legal system increasingly
addressing specifically the rights of children. As the first case in which
the Supreme Court began to recognize the constitutionally protected
rights of children, In re Gault 79 is viewed as the start of the fourth era in
the development of children's rights. 80 In this case the Supreme Court
held that a juvenile faced with proceedings to determine if he is a delin-
quent, which may result in institutionalization, has certain due process
rights provided by the Fourteenth Amendment, for example, the right to
notice of charges,8 the right to counsel, 2 and the privilege against self-
incrimination. 3  In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, 8 4 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
school regulation prohibiting students from wearing black armbands in
protest of the war in Vietnam. The Court held that the prohibition
against the armbands violated the students' constitutional right of free-
dom of expression,8 5 thus indicating that children have First Amend-
ment rights. Perhaps of even greater significance, Justice Fortas, in
delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that the students were "per-
sons under our constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights
which the state must respect."'8 6 In Planned Parenthood of Central Mis-
souri v. Danforth,87 the Supreme Court held as unconstitutional the state
law requirement that a girl under the age of eighteen obtain a parent's
written permission before obtaining an abortion. In Danforth, the Court
77. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
78. Id. at 639-40.
79. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children In Custody
Decisions.: All That Glitters Is Not Gault, 15 J. FAM. L. 27 (1976-77), for a discussion of the general-
ization of the Gault holding, regarding the need for legal representation of children, to the area of
custody disputes.
80. Horowitz, supra note 34, at 4; Michael S. Wald, Children's Rights. A Framework for Anal-
ysis, 12 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 255, 266 (1979).
81. Gault, supra note 79, at 33-34.
82. Id. at 41.
83. Id. at 55. See Charles R. Tremper, Respect for the Human Dignity of Minors: What the
Constitution Requires, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1293, 1321-24 (1988), for a discussion of Gault as the
seminal case in recognizing minors as "persons" under the law.
84. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
85. Id. at 511.
86. Id.
87. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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made the clear statement that "constitutional rights do not mature and
come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
maturity. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution
and possess constitutional rights."88 In Carey v. Population Services, In-
ternational,8 9 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute prohibit-
ing distribution of contraceptives to minors under the age of sixteen as
violating the minor's right to privacy, which "in connection with deci-
sions effecting procreation extends to minors as well as adults." 9 There
is other evidence of the legal system giving increasing regard to the rights
of children as persons under the law9' and as beings separate from their
parents. In custody disputes between parents, most states by statute or
case law give consideration to the child's preference in applying the best
interest standard.92 Georgia state law mandates that the child's prefer-
ence be respected unless the chosen parent is shown to be unfit.93
It is clear then that there has been a progression in the way that the
law views children. Children were once viewed only as the property of
the father. Later, although they were still viewed as property, more at-
tention was paid to their need for special care. In this century, American
law has begun to recognize that children are persons under the Constitu-
tion and have constitutional rights, as well as needs and preferences, sep-
arate from those of their parents, that deserve legal recognition.
II. PARENTS' RIGHTS AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN THIRD PARTY
CUSTODY DISPUTES
Society's perspective on the parent-child relationship has clearly
gone through numerous changes over time in the ways parents and chil-
dren have been perceived in relation to each other and in relation to soci-
ety.94 A contemporary legal situation which brings to light this changing
perspective on the parent-child relationship is the battle between the bio-
logical parent and a third party for the custody of the child. As noted
above, this type of conflict may arise when a child is raised by an adult
other than the biological parent for an extended period of time. This
88. Id. at 74.
89. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
90. Id. at 693.
91. An interesting extension of "minors" being viewed as persons under the law is a Louisiana
law under which an in vitro fertilized ovum is considered to be a "judicial person." LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:123 (West 1990). Louisiana law further provides that disputes regarding the in vitro fertil-
ized ovum are to be resolved using the best interests standard. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:131 (West
1990).
92. For a general discussion, see 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 11 (1978 & Supp. 1990).
93. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1 (1990).
94. See supra notes 32-93 and accompanying text.
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situation may arise, for example, when a parent who feels unprepared for
parenthood permits the child's grandparents to raise the child, or when a
child has been placed in foster care by the state. It may also occur when
a child has been raised by one of his natural parents and a stepparent, the
natural parent who has raised the child dies and the other natural parent
disputes the custody with the stepparent. 95 The adult, with whom the
child has been left, and the child develop a parent-child relationship.
The biological parent then demands the return of the child and a custody
battle ensues. To settle the issue, courts will then use either the parents'
rights standard or the best interest of the child standard, depending upon
the jurisdiction. 96
In the jurisdictions using the best interest of the child standard, the
court will give custody of the child to the adult, whether the biological
parent or the third party, who, in the court's opinion, will serve the
child's best interest. Typical of the position taken in the best interest
jurisdictions is that "[t]he question of legal custody is decided under the
best interest of the child standard (citation omitted) without having to
establish parental unfitness."'97 Painter v. Bannister98 is a case frequently
used as an example of a biological parent versus third party custody dis-
pute decided in a "best interest" jurisdiction. In Painter, the Supreme
Court of Iowa awarded custody of a boy, Mark, to his natural grandpar-
ents, who had cared for the boy for two years after the mother's death,
rather than to Mark's natural father. When, after two years, Mark's fa-
ther wished to have the boy return to live with him, the grandparents
contested. The Iowa Supreme Court, referring to the "stable atmos-
phere" 99 of the grandparent's home and using the best interest standard,
awarded custody to the grandparents. This court also gave qualified sig-
95. Obviously another way that this situation can occur is through a mix-up of babies shortly
after birth, at the hospital, as in the situation with the Twiggs family, supra notes 6-7 and accompa-
nying text.
96. See generally Haynie, supra note 28; Hilderbran, supra note 28; McGough & Shindell,
supra note 33. It is difficult to determine how many jurisdictions adhere to which standard. Appli-
cations and distinctions between the standards can be blurred so that commentators often disagree
about which jurisdictions do what. See Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclu-
sive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When The Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70
VA. L. REV. 879, 881-82 (1984). One commentator has used the idea of a "continuum" between
parental rights standard and the best interests of the child standard. Note, Jurisdiction, Standing,
and Decisional Standards in Parent-Nonparent Custody Disputes-In re Marriage of Allen, 626 P.2d
16 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981), 58 WASH. L. REV. 111, 115 (1982). For attempts at classifying jurisdic-
tions, see Haynie, supra note 28, and Smith, supra note 28.
97. Montgomery v. Roudez, 509 N.E.2d 499, 501-02 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). In Montgomery, as
is typical of best interest jurisdictions, the third party had to demonstrate "standing," i.e., that the
child was not in custody of a biological parent at the time the action was brought. Id.
98. 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
99. Id. at 158.
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nificance to the statement of a psychologist, who had evaluated the boy,
that Mark psychologically regarded the grandparents as his actual
parents. 0
The concept of "psychological parent" has frequently been an essen-
tial concept in biological versus third party custody disputes.' 0 This
concept is defined as follows:
A psychological parent is one who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis,
through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills
the child's psychological needs for a parent,as well as the child's physi-
cal needs. The psychological parent may be a biological (citation omit-
ted), adoptive, foster, or common-law (citation omitted) parent, or any
other person. There is no presumption in favor of any of these after
the initial assignment at birth (citation omitted).10 2
The concept of "psychological parent" has influenced the thinking of
courts, particularly in best interest jurisdictions.10 3 These courts espouse
the idea that the best interests of the child are best served by placing the
child with the adult with whom the child actually has the parent-child
relationship, whether or not that adult is the biological parent.
In the parental rights jurisdictions, the courts tend to operate on the
rule that the biological parent has an overriding right to his or her child
and the best interests of the child should not be considered in determin-
ing custody unless the biological parent can be shown to be unfit.' 4 It
will be illustrative to look at relevant cases from states generally consid-
ered to be parental rights jurisdictions, such as Arkansas and Georgia. 0 5
In Stamps v. Rawlins ' 06 the Supreme Court of Arkansas decided a cus-
tody battle between a five-year-old boy's natural mother and stepfather.
The court decided for the boy's natural mother, stating "[O]ur case law
specifically establishes a preference for natural parents in custody mat-
ters, and provides that the preference must prevail unless it is established
that the natural parent is unfit."' 0 7 The Stamps court does not provide a
rationale for this position but rather cites to the authority of a prior case,
Goins v. Edens. 0 8 The Goins court, likewise, cites to a number of prior
100. Id. at 157-58.
101. See generally Symposium, The Impact of Psychological Parenting on Child Welfare Decision
Making, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 483 (1983-84); Haynie, supra note 28.
102. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 98 (1973).
103. Symposium, supra note 101, at 485-88. See also Haynie, supra note 28.
104. See Haynie, supra note 28; Smith, supra note 28.
105. Haynie, supra note 28, at 708-12; Smith, supra note 28, at 548; see generally McGough &
Shindell, supra note 33.
106. 761 S.W.2d 933 (Ark. 1988).
107. Id. at 935.
108. 394 S.W.2d 124 (Ark. 1965).
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cases, among them McGraw v. Rose. 109 The pattern then continues with
McGraw 110 citing to Hazelip v. Taylor I I I and Hazelip 1 2 citing to Verser
v. Ford.' 3 In Verser v. Ford, a three-year-old girl, whose mother died in
childbirth, had lived with her grandparents since a few days after birth.
The father of the girl remarried and sought custody of the girl. The
grandparents resisted and a custody battle ensued. The 1881 Arkansas
Supreme Court made a fairly strong statement regarding whom it be-
lieved to be the preferred custodian.
It is one of the cardinal principles of nature and of law that, as
against strangers, the father, however poor and humble, if able to sup-
port the child in his own style of life, and of good moral character,
cannot, without the most shocking injustice, be deprived of the privi-
lege by any one whatever, however brilliant the advantage he may of-
fer. It is not enough to consider the interests of the child alone. As
between the father, too, and the mother, or any other near relation of
the infant, where sympathies on either side of the tenderest nature may
be relied on with confidence, the father is generally to be preferred. In
the great majority of cases, his greater ability and knowledge of the
world renders him the fittest protector, although that is not the test.
The preference is conceded to the ties of duty and affection, and at-
tends the primary obligation of the father to maintain, educate and
promote the happiness of the child, according to his own best judg-
ment and the means within his power. Any system of jurisprudence
which would enable the Courts, in their discretion and with a view
solely to the child's best interests, to take from him that right and in-
terfere with those duties, would be intolerably tyrannical, as well as
Utopian. 1
14
The Verser court appears to be saying that the father has a right to
custody of his child, even over the rights of the mother. The court also
indicates both that this right in some ways overrides the consideration of
the best interests of the child-"[i]t is not enough to consider the inter-
ests of the child alone" 1' 5-and that custody by the father is in the
child's best interests. It seems to be assumed that the father will best be
able to serve the interests of the child because the father has "greater
ability and knowledge of the world"" 6 and because "of ties of duty and
affection,"" 17 apparently arising out of the father's biological connection
with the child. Clearly, no one any longer believes, if anyone ever did,
109. 271 S.W.2d 912 (Ark. 1954).
110. Id. at 914.
111. 190 S.W.2d 982 (Ark. 1945).
112. Id. at 983.
113. 37 Ark. 27 (1881).
114. Id. at 29-30.
115. Id. at 30.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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that a father is better suited than anyone else to care for a child because
of his greater ability and worldliness. Further, it would be difficult to
argue that the biological connection between parent and child necessarily
implies behavior by the parent arising out of "duty and affection,"" I 8 par-
ticularly after one looks at the records of any state children and family
service agency.
Interestingly, and, for purposes of our discussion, very significantly,
the Verser court did not in fact award custody of the child to the father,
but to the grandparents. In awarding custody to the grandparents, the
court referred to "exceptional cases" and stated that "this delicate discre-
tion [of awarding custody to someone other than the father] will be more
freely exercised in behalf of one whose ties of affection are next to those
of the father himself, upon whom the accompanying moral obligations
would devolve in case of the father's death."1 19 However, the court
seems to have based much of its decision on the care that the child had
received from the grandparents, particularly, the grandmother-"There
has been all of a mother's care, and scarcely less than a mother's affection
... she is in a safe asylum, surrounded by those who may be trusted to
guard her anxiously against pernicious influences"I 20 -and the relation-
ship which, with the father's agreement, had developed between the child
and her grandmother-"By his assent ties have been woven between the
grand-mother and grand-daughter, which he is under strong obligation
to respect, and which he ought not wantonly and suddenly to tear asun-
der."' 121 The court clearly stated that the father was not unfit-"The
father has shown himself to be a moral man, with the means of discharg-
ing his parental obligations."' 22
Verser v. Ford is one of the primary cases cited as authority to sup-
port the use of the parental rights doctrine in Arkansas. The case was
decided in 1881. The historical context of that case was clearly one dif-
ferent from contemporary American society. The father was still consid-
ered the lord of the family, with his wife and children subservient to him.
The father was seen as the only one competent to direct the family. The
tender years doctrine was in its infancy. 123 Chapsky v. Wood, 124 one of
the cases seen as at the beginning of the best interest doctrine, was de-
cided the same year. Society has changed significantly; perceptions of
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 30-31.
121. Id. at 31.
122. Id.
123. Davidson & Gerlach, supra note 51, at 234.
124. 26 Kan. 650 (1881); Davidson & Gerlach, supra note 51, at 237.
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what is real have changed and most of the assumptions upon which the
paternal rights statement of Verser and the parental rights doctrine of
later cases are based are no longer considered to be true. Yet the pater-
nal rights position of Verser, through a line of cases, is used as authority
for the parental rights doctrine. In addition, the Verser case, used ulti-
mately to support the position that a parent has a right to custody of his
or her child unless the parent be shown to be unfit and only then can the
best interest of the child be considered, was in fact decided upon best
interest of the child criteria, taking into account the relationship of the
child with the third party and despite the natural parent being perceived
as a fit parent. It would seem that this case, while giving lip service to
the accepted view of the time that the father is lord of the home, was
actually decided for the benefit of the child, using what might be consid-
ered today as a children's rights standard.
An investigation into Georgia biological parent versus third party
custody dispute cases leads to similar results. Mitchell v. Mitchell 125 is a
case involving a custody dispute between a child's father and maternal
grandparents. The court in Mitchell quotes Larson v. Gambrell,126
[A]n award of child custody to 'a third party' must be based upon
more than the best interests of the child because such an award is in
derogation of the right to custody of the parent, in whose custody the
law presumes the child's best interest will be served. Thus, it is only
when the present unfitness of the parent is established by clear and
convincing evidence that the trial judge is authorized to consider an
award of custody to third parties. 127
Neither the Mitchell court nor the Larson court attempted to justify this
presumption but simply cited to previous cases, Larson citing to Childs v.
Childs.128 The Childs court restated the same doctrine and cited to
Heath v. Martin,129 among other cases, again without attempting to jus-
tify the doctrine other than by citing to previous authority. The pattern
continues with Heath citing to Hill v. Rivers, 130 Hill citing to Sloan v.
Jones,'3 ' and Sloan citing to Miller v. Wallace.132 In Miller, the Georgia
court decided the custody of a child who had lived with her maternal
grandparents for an undisclosed period of time. The custody dispute was
125. 363 S.E.2d 159 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
126. 276 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981).
127. Mitchell, 363 S.E.2d at 163 (quoting Larson, 276 S.E.2d at 688).
128. 227 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. 1976).
129. 167 S.E.2d 153 (Ga. 1969).
130. 37 S.E.2d 386 (Ga. 1946).
131. 62 S.E. 21 (Ga. 1908).
132. 76 Ga. 479 (1886).
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between the child's father and the child's maternal grandparents. 133 The
Miller court stated,
Primafacie, the right of custody of an infant is in the father, and when
this right is resisted, upon the ground of his unfitness for the trust or
other cause, a proper regard to the sanctity of the parental relation will
require that the objection be sustained by clear and satisfactory
proofs. ... The rights of the father, on the one hand, and the perma-
nent interest and welfare of the infant, on the other, are both to be
regarded, but the right of the father is paramount, and should not be
disregarded, except for grave cause. The breaking of the tie that binds
them to each other can never be justified without the most solid and
substantial reasons, established by plain proof.134
The court decided for the father. But even in using the parental rights
doctrine as the basis for this decision, the court felt a need to address the
welfare of the child, for example, "The defendant's [father's] means of
taking care of his child are more certain and ample than the means of
those of the [grandparents] who would deprive him of her control."13 5
Again, as in Arkansas, Georgia's parental rights doctrine is traced
through a direct line of cases to a case decided at a time where societal
and legal perspectives and basic assumptions are clearly different from
those of today. Miller was decided in 1886, at a time when the father was
considered supreme in the family, a time at the beginning of the best
interest doctrine, and prior to any recognition that children might be
legal persons themselves with rights of their own. Even so, even at this
time, the Miller court clearly did not feel comfortable ignoring child in-
terest issues. ' 36
One Georgia case, Blackburn v. Blackburn, 37 seems to use recent
decisions by the United States Supreme Court to support the parental
rights doctrine. In Blackburn, the Georgia Supreme Court decided a
custody dispute between a child's natural mother and the child's paternal
grandmother in favor of the natural mother.1 38 The court said that be-
cause this case involved a third party and the rights of a parent might be
terminated, the court had to evaluate whether the natural parent was
unfit and whether that parent's unfitness must be proven under a "clear
and convincing" standard. 139 The Blackburn court quoted the United
States Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer,'40 stating that " 'freedom
133. Id. at 483.
134. Id. at 486-87 (second emphasis added).
135. Id. at 492.
136. For another discussion of Georgia law, see McGough & Shindell, supra note 33, at 222-41.
137. 292 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. 1982).
138. Id. at 826.
139. Id. at 825.
140. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
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of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty inter-
est' " and therefore "the trial court [must] find 'clear and convincing evi-
dence' of a parent's unfitness prior to terminating the parent's rights in
his child." 141 The Blackburn court indicated that the clear and convinc-
ing standard mandated by the Supreme Court "forestalls arbitrary State
interference with the integrity of the family unit."'142
To take the analysis a step further, it would be useful to look at
Santosky. The Santosky Court, in arriving at its statement that family
life is a liberty interest to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, 143
cited to, among other cases, Meyer v. Nebraska 144 and Prince v. Massa-
chusetts.145 In Meyer the Court held that among the liberty interests pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment is the right "to marry, establish a
home and bring up children." 1 46 In Prince the Supreme Court said, "It is
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include prepa-
ration for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder,"1 47 and
referred to "the private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter." 14
8
In a biological parent versus third party custody dispute, a common
scenario is that the child has not been in the physical custody of the
biological parent for an extended period of time. The third party has
raised and cared for the child and frequently the child and the third
party have formed a relationship typical of what would be expected in a
parent-child relationship. An essential question then becomes one of def-
inition. Where is the "family unit" whose integrity 149 needs to be pro-
tected and where is the "private realm of family life" protected from
state intrusion? Is the "family" the relationship developed over time be-
tween the child and the third party or is it some conceptual, ephemeral
entity somehow connected with the natural parent's biological connec-
tion to the child? For that matter, who is the parent? Is the parent the
individual who has actually provided for the "care and nurture of the
child" in preparing the child to meet his or her "obligations" to society
141. Blackburn, 292 S.E.2d at 825 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753, 769).
142. Blackburn, 292 S.E.2d at 825.
143. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
144. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
145. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
146. 262 U.S. at 399.
147. 321 U.S. at 166.
148. Id.
149. Integrity is defined as "an unimpaired or unmarred condition... [; and] the quality or state
of being complete or undivided." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED (Philip B. Grove, Ph.D. et al. eds., 1986).
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or is the parent the individual who has a biological connection to the
child because of a relatively brief episode of sexual intercourse, perhaps
years earlier? It would seem to make the most sense to decide that the
real family is the one where familial relations have developed and that
the real parent is the individual who acted like a parent and formed a
parent-child relationship with the child. The child involved would defi-
nitely answer this way. 150 Courts in parental rights jurisdictions follow
the doctrine that the natural parent has a right to his or her biological
child unless the parent can be shown to be unfit and only if the parent is
shown to be unfit are the best interests of the child considered. Courts in
these jurisdictions would therefore answer in favor of the biological par-
ent and theoretically not consider the child's perspective unless the natu-
ral parent should be shown to be unfit.
III. THE REDEFINITION OF PARENTHOOD AND FAMILY AS A
RESULT OF LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS
It would seem to be beneficial at this time to look at the question of
how the law defines "parent" and "family." For purposes of this discus-
sion, I will primarily examine six relatively recent Supreme Court cases:
Stanley v. Illinois,151 Quilloin v. Walcott,152 Caban v. Mohammed, 53
Lehr v. Robertson, 54 Moore v. City of East Cleveland,155 and Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families.56 Stanley involved a father of three
children who lived unmarried with their mother and participated in rais-
ing the children until she died. According to Illinois law, upon the
mother's death, the children became wards of the state. The father con-
tested, seeking custody. The Supreme Court upheld the father's right to
custody of the children. 57 In Caban, a man and a woman lived together
unmarried for five years and produced two children. Both parents took
an active part in caring for the children. 58 The father continued to
maintain relationships with the children after he and the woman sepa-
150. Tremper, supra note 83, argues that minors have a constitutionally protected right to be
treated with dignity. "Taking the child's preference into account, even if it ultimately is overruled,
constitutes the difference between being and nothingness that is central to dignity." Id. at 1314.
151. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
152. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
153. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
154. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
155. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
156. 431 U.S. 816 (1977). For similar discussion of these cases, see, John L. Hill, What Does it
Mean to be a "Parent'? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y. U. L. REV.
353 (1991); Haynie, supra note 28; Francis B. McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and
Meaning of Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975 (1988).
157. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646, 657-59.
158. Caban, 441 U.S. at 382, 389.
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rated. Eventually the woman married another man and when her hus-
band filed for adoption, the father of the children contested the New
York law which gave the mother exclusive right to consent to the adop-
tion because the children were illegitimate.'3 9 The Supreme Court de-
cided in favor of the natural father on equal protection grounds and
referred to the substantial relationship the natural father had established
and maintained with the children. 160 In contrast are the cases of Quilloin
and Lehr. In both of these cases, a biological father attempted to stop
the adoption by the child's mother's husband.' 6' In both of these cases,
the biological father had not supported the child and had never devel-
oped a parental relationship with the child.' 62 In both of these cases, the
Supreme Court permitted the adoptions.1 63 These four cases taken to-
gether give the impression that what was significant was not the biologi-
cal connection but the parent-child relationships which the fathers did or
did not form with their children. The Lehr Court clearly connected pa-
rental rights and parental responsibilities, stating that the "rights of the
parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed."' 64
This seems to be just one step short of saying that someone who has not
acted as a parent in assuming parental duties and responsibilities will not
be considered to be a parent legally. The cases of Moore v. City of
Cleveland 165 and Smith v. Organization of Foster Families166 touched
upon the issue of how "family" is to be defined legally. In Moore the
Court addressed a Cleveland housing ordinance which restricted housing
units to one family. A woman who lived with her son and two grandsons
was told by the city that her group was not a single family and that they
would have to move into separate dwellings. The woman contested the
ordinance and the Supreme Court decided in her favor, holding that her
extended family was in fact a family, despite the fact that it was not a
nuclear family, and therefore was entitled to constitutional protection.
Of significance to our discussion is a statement made in the Court's opin-
ion: "Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity
of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is through the family
that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values,
159. Id. at 382-83.
160. Id. at 393-94.
161. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 249-50.
162. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 251-56; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 249-50.
163. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 257; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68.
164. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 257-58.
165. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
166. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
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moral and cultural."'167 In our hypothesized biological parent versus
third party custody dispute, the child's relationship with the third party
passes to the child, the "cherished values, moral and cultural." Yet, in
parental rights jurisdictions, this relationship would in effect not be con-
sidered a "family."
In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families a group of foster parents
and organizations challenged New York City and New York State proce-
dures for removal of foster children from foster homes, arguing that the
procedures violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The foster parents lost.1 68 However, the Court
in dicta made statements indicating that a family is determined by factors
other than biology: "But biological relationships are not exclusive deter-
mination [sic] of the existence of a family. The basic foundation of the
family in our society, the marriage relationship, is of course not a matter
of blood relation. Yet its importance has been strongly emphasized in
our cases." 169 Later, the Smith Court clearly indicated that the impor-
tance of the family is to be seen in emotional factors:
Thus the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals in-
volved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that
derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays
in "promoting a way of life" through the instruction of children, Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972), as well as from the fact of
blood relationship.' 70
The six cases considered together reveal an emerging trend of seeing
the significance of the parental role and familial relationship not in terms
of biological connection but in terms of emotional relationships. This
trend is counter to the importance placed on biological connection by
courts in parental rights jurisdictions in deciding biological parent versus
third party custody disputes. 17 t
167. 431 U.S. at 503-04.
168. The Court decided against the foster parents, in part, on grounds that the foster parent
program was a state-created entity, created for a specific purpose, and therefore, for that reason and
for contractual reasons, the foster parents could not expect the system to operate differently. Smith,
432 U.S. at 845-46.
169. Id. at 843. The Court also pointed out that the relevant custodian of the children in Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), was in fact not a parent but an aunt. Smith, 431 U.S. at 843.
170. Id. at 844.
171. A concept which offers a basis other than biology for defining "parent" is the concept of
equitable parent. In Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987), the Michigan
Court of Appeals granted the visitation rights as a natural father to a man who had been proven by
blood test not to be the biological father of a four-year-old boy. They based the decision on the
doctrine of equitable parent. The man and boy had seen each other as being father and son for four
years. When the mother filed for divorce, she revealed that her husband had not been the biological
father of the boy through blood tests. This court, however, held that, since under Michigan law, a
man who takes on the status of a father, and who acts and presents himself as such to the world, can
be estopped from denying his paternal responsibilities, that man also should have the rights of a
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Some of the most striking developments which have significant im-
pact on how the parent-child relationship is perceived legally are those
technological developments related to conception, that is, in vitro fertili-
zation and surrogacy. 72 These developments put into question the very
definitions of parent and child. As one author put it,
Surrogacy is one of the most hotly contested questions of our time.
The ramifications of the answer our courts and legislatures reach may
affect personal and economic liberty in unforeseen ways (footnote
omitted.) The answer will profoundly affect the way our society views
the relationship between parent and child and, consequently, the real-
ity of the relationship between parents and children of the future and
the power of the state to regulate that relationship.' 73
For instance, in surrogacy, a woman contracts either to be impregnated
with the sperm of a man via artificial insemination t 74 or to carry the
fertilized ovum of a woman physically unable to carry a pregnancy. As
part of the contract, the surrogate mother agrees to give up custody of
the child after the birth to the man or couple who provided the genetic
material and who were the intended parents. t7 5 On the other hand, arti-
ficial insemination can also be used in the situation where a couple wishes
to have a child and the husband is infertile. The couple can contract
with a sperm donor to have the wife impregnated via artificial insemina-
tion. The statutes of many states provide that the sperm donor will have
no rights or responsibilities as a parent. 176 This apparent inconsistency
father. See also Nicholas S. Andrews, Note, Atkinson v. Atkinson: Adoption of the Equitable Parent,
1988 DET. C. L. REV. 119; Rebekah F. Visconti, Note, The Legal Relationship of a Nonbiological
Father to His Child: A Matter of Equity, 66 U. DET. L. REV. 97 (1988).
172. For a discussion of the inadequacies of defining the parent in surrogacy situations in terms
of biological contribution see Hill, supra note 156. Irma S. Russell, Within the Best Interests of the
Child. The Factor of Parental Status in Custody Disputes Arising From Surrogacy Contracts, 27 J.
FAM. L. 585 (1988-89); Denise S. Kaiser, Note, Artificial Insemination: Donors Rights in Situations
Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793 (1987-88); Natalie L. Clark, New Wine in Old
Skins: Using Paternity-Suit Settlements to Facilitate Surrogate Motherhood, 25 J. FAM. L. 483 (1986-
87); Harry D. Krause, Artificial Conception: Legislative Approaches, 19 FAM. L.Q. 185 (1985);
George J. Annas, Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the Best Interest of the Sperm Donor, 14 FAM. L.Q. 1
(1980).
173. Russell, supra note 172, at 593.
174. Artificial insemination is defined as "[m]echanical injection of viable semen into the va-
gina." TABOR'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY (13th ed. 1977).
175. Courts seem to generally support the awarding of the custody of the child to the intended
parents. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Surrogate Denied Custody of Child, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1990, at
A14. Even in the case of In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), where the New Jersey Supreme
Court held the surrogacy contract as illegal and therefore invalid, the court awarded custody of the
child to the man who had contracted with the surrogate, in effect recognizing his parenthood.
176. See e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 109.239 (1989):
Rights and obligations of children resulting from artificial insemination; rights and obliga-
tions of donor of semen. If the donor of semen used in artificial insemination is not the
mother's husband: (1) Such donor shall have no right, obligation or interest with respect to
a child born as a result of artificial insemination; and (2) A child born as a result of artifi-
cial insemination shall have no right, obligation or interest with respect to such donor.
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opens even further the question of who will be considered a parent.1 77
Defining parenthood in terms of biology is no longer practical or
feasible. It would seem to make more sense to define parent in terms of
the actual relationship with a child. The concept of "psychological par-
ent" 78 would provide a sound basis for this definition. "Psychological
parent" takes into account the relevant realities of the situation under
consideration. It considers that person to be a parent who has actually
acted as a parent, who has assumed the responsibilities of a parent, who
has formed a parent-child relationship with the child in question and
whom the child perceives and relates to as a parent. From the perspec-
tive of society, it is the child's relationship with the psychological parent
which is ensuring that the child does not have to be cared for by the state
and it is in that relationship the child will be taught what he or she needs
to learn to be a productive member of society.
There is a trend to emphasize emotional bonding at least as much as
biology in certain Supreme Court custody cases. 179 Because of techno-
logical developments, defining parenthood in terms of biology is becom-
ing increasingly unfeasible.' s0 The legal rights of children have been
increasingly recognized.' 8 ' Yet, in antithesis to these trends, courts in
parental rights jurisdictions decide biological parent versus third party
custody disputes solely based on biology and without regard to any emo-
tional bond that may have formed between the child and the third party
and without regard to the child's rights or interests.
IV. ATTACHMENT THEORY IN CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES
In parental rights jurisdictions, unless the biological parent can be
proven to be unfit, the interests of the child are not considered in biologi-
cal parent versus third party custody disputes.182 When these interests
carry considerable weight for the child, this can be a significant omission.
In this section, this Note will present a brief discussion of attachment
177. Hill, supra note 156, at 355, points out that in a surrogacy arrangement, there could be as
many as five individuals who could conceivably claim to be a parent: the sperm donor, the egg
donor, the surrogate (gestational host), and the two individuals not biologically related to the child
but who intend to raise the child.
178. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 102.
179. See supra notes 151-170 and accompanying text. For further discussion, see, The Constitu-
tion and the Family, supra note 53, at 1270-313; Hilderbran, supra note 28, at 1223-29; Haynie, supra
note 28, at 729-35.
180. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
182. See Haynie, supra note 28; Smith, supra note 28.
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theory1 3 and of the possible implications of this theory for child custody
determinations. 184
Attachment theory is the "best supported theory of socio-emotional
development."' 185 Attachment theory focuses on a behavioral/emotional
bond or attachment, 18 6 which is formed, mediated, maintained, and de-
veloped 187 through attachment behavior. "Attachment behavior is con-
ceived as any form of behavior that results in a person attaining or
retaining proximity to some other differentiated and preferred individ-
ual."1"8 Attachments are formed throughout life189 but the majority of
study in attachment theory has focused on the initial attachment that the
human infant makes' 90 and that attachment is most relevant to this
discussion.
Attachment behavior is universal to all children. 191 The attachment
forms a "secure base"'192 for children from which to explore the world,
learn and develop social skills, at least through adolescence, 193 and prob-
ably into adulthood. 194 The young child will explore away from the at-
tachment figure, investigating the world and other people. Then when
the child feels fearful, the child will rush back to the security of the at-
tachment figure. This type of behavior can be seen in some variations
throughout the years of major development. The ambivalence the ado-
lescent exhibits toward a parent is an example of this process, the adoles-
cent at times wanting closeness with the parent and at times distancing
himself. The attachment with the caregiver is the basis for formation of
self-reliance, competence, 19 5 and a capacity to form relationships. 9 6
Two points of attachment theory are particularly relevant to this
discussion. The first is that the attachment is formed through interaction
183. See generally I BOWLBY, supra note 31; 2 BOWLBY supra note 31; 3 BOWLBY supra note
31.
184. See Mitchell E. Radin, The Role of the Lawyer for the Preschool Child in Custody Litigation,
9 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 431 (1981), for a discussion of the usefulness to a child custody attorney to
have knowledge of attachment theory.
185. JOHN BOWLBY, A SECURE BASE 28 (1988).
186. MARY D. SALTER AINSWORTH ET AL., PATFERNS OF ATTACHMENT 302 (1978).
187. Id.
188. 3 BOWLBY, supra note 31, at 39.
189. Mary D. Salter Ainsworth, Attachments Beyond Infancy, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Apr. 1989,
at 709; Willard W. Hartup, Social Relationships and Their Developmental Significance, AM. PsY-
CHOLOGIST, Feb. 1989, at 120; 1 BOWLEY, supra note 31, at 206.
190. MARK T. GREENBERG ET AL., ATTACHMENT IN THE PRESCHOOL YEARS 3 (1990).
191. BOWLBY, supra note 185, at 28.
192. AINSWORTH, supra note 186 at 20; BoWLBY, supra note 185, at 163.
193. BoWLBY, supra note 185, at 163.
194. AINSWORTH, supra note 189; 1 BOWLBY, supra note 31, at 20.
195. GREENBERG, supra note 190, at 185.
196. Id. at 31.
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between the infant and the primary caregiver. For example, the infant
signals the need for care through crying and the caregiver then provides
care. The attachment is with the primary caregiver but that caregiver
does not have to be the biological parent. Bowlby states:
Although, throughout this book the text refers usually to "mother"
and not to "mother-figure," it is to be understood that in every case
reference is to the person who mothers a child and to whom he be-
comes attached. For most children, of course, that person is also his
natural mother. 1 97
The second point of relevance to our discussion is that disruption of this
attachment with the primary caregiver has been shown to be psychologi-
cally traumatic and damaging, particularly in pre-school years, 198 but
throughout childhood. 199 Spitz200 has described some of the extremely
harmful effects young children may suffer due to separation from the
attachment figure. He reports on institutionalized infants separated from
their primary caregiver. He reports that for the first six months the chil-
dren seem to do fine. After that first six months, however, the children
begin to exhibit symptoms of what Spitz refers to as anaclitic depression.
At first the children become weepy and clinging. Then, their weeping
becomes wailing. The children experience weight loss and the child's
development is retarded. Then the children begin to refuse contact. In-
somnia, weight loss, facial rigidity, and physical illness develop.201 Spitz
noticed that anaclitic depression occurs more frequently and in much
more severe forms during separations prior to which there existed good
mother-child relations. Spitz and others have shown that separation or
loss in early childhood of the attached caregiver relates to conduct
problems throughout childhood 20 2 and later in life, cognitive distur-
bances, 20 3 depression, 20 4 suicide risk,2° 5 and a generally increased risk of
psychiatric disturbance. 20 6
James Robertson 20 7 discusses the issue of emotional and psychologi-
cal damage to a child resulting from separation from the primary
197. 1 BOWLBY, supra note 31, at 29.
198. GREENBERG, supra note 190.
199. JOHN ROBERTSON, YOUNG CHILDREN IN HOSPITAL 19 (1970).
200. RENE SPITZ, THE FIRST YEAR OF LIFE 268 (1965).
201. Id. at 277. Spitz notes that if deprivation from emotionally nurturing figures is prolonged
and severe, irreversible deterioration can occur, at times leading to death. Id. at 278-79.
202. GREENBERG, supra note 190, at 225.
203. BOWLBY, supra note 185, at 99.
204. 3 BOWLBY, supra note 31, at 248, 257.
205. Id. at 310.
206. Id. at 295.
207. ROBERTSON, supra note 199.
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caregiver. The context is long-term hospitalization. Referring to the
children separated from the mother-figure, Robertson says:
The behaviour of all of these children made great difficulties for their
families for some years afterwards. Eight years after discharge the in-
dividual outcomes are varied, but each child has a residue of impair-
ment of personality and mental functioning of a kind that was broadly
predictable on the basis of their emotional states at time of discharge
from the long-stay hospital. 208
Developmentally, the separation from the attached figure is a psy-
chological trauma, an emotional injury. Without the availability of the
attachment figure, the child no longer feels safe and is no longer able to
deal with the world from a position of security in which to learn to func-
tion socially and manage his own feelings, particularly anger and sad-
ness, in the social context. Robertson is focusing primarily on children
under age four, but he is quick to state that this age is arbitrarily cho-
sen. 2°9 He suggests that the damaging effects of the child's separation
from the attachment figure are sufficiently significant to warrant changes
in hospital procedures. He spends a good portion of his book discussing
his recommended changes, including admission of mother and child to-
gether so that the separation does not occur.210 If the temporary separa-
tion of the hospitalized child from the attachment figure can cause such
significant and long-lasting psychological disturbance, how much more
so the permanent loss of the attachment figure when custody of a child is
removed from the third-party parent, perhaps the only parent the child
has ever known, and given to the biological parent. Given that one of the
more current and respected schools of developmental psychology de-
scribes so persuasively the harm, some of it extremely serious, that may
befall a child separated from his or her attachment figure, it is incompre-
hensible that jurisdictions which advocate the parental rights doctrine
consider interests of the child only if the child's natural parent is shown
to be unfit.
V. SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Note has been to argue that the use of the paren-
tal rights doctrine in child custody disputes, where use of that doctrine
justifies not even considering the child's interest, is a practice that is no
longer supportable. This Note has discussed the development of the legal
rights of children. Children have progressed from being considered only
208. Id. at 19.
209. Id. at 87.
210. Id. at 36.
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property. Within the past few decades it has been recognized that chil-
dren are persons under the Constitution with rights, in most ways equal
to adults. Recent legal developments in recognizing emotional bonding
as at least important as biological connection in defining parenthood and
family, make the definition of parent by biology alone particularly unper-
suasive. Technological developments, particularly in the areas of surro-
gacy and in vitro fertilization, have put the law in a position where
defining parenthood via biological connection is unworkable. Yet, in the
face of all of this, some jurisdictions define parenthood strictly by biologi-
cal connection. Further, in mandating that unless that biologically-de-
fined parent can be proven to be unfit the interests of the child are not to
be considered, these jurisdictions return to the time when children were
treated as property, without legal rights.211
To further emphasize the gravity of this lack of respect for the rights
of children in the use of the parental rights doctrine, attachment theory
sheds light on the severity of damage that can be done. When a child has
been cared for and raised by an adult, that child and adult form an emo-
tional bond. The child becomes attached to the adult as a source of se-
curity needed for health and future growth and development. This
attachment is particularly significant when the adult has raised the child
from infancy. The adult and child have a parent-child relationship.
When the adult is not a biological parent to the child, in parental rights
jurisdictions, a biological parent can demand custody of the child. Un-
less the biological parent can be proven to be an unfit parent, the child's
custody will be awarded to the biological parent. Theoretically, in a pa-
rental rights jurisdiction, no consideration will be given to the psycholog-
ical damage that will be done to the child at the loss of the attachment
figure, the adult who has raised the child. Attachment theory is very
clear, however, that damage likely will be done. Psychological damage
may take the form of developmental problems later in childhood or of
psychiatric disorders in adulthood, such as depression, suicidism, and
chronic inability to form meaningful relationships.
Psychological maltreatment has been defined as "acts of omission
and commission which are judged by community standards and profes-
sional expertise to be psychologically damaging. ' 21 2 In light of attach-
211. If the Supreme Court in the case of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966), could hold that a boy
about to be committed to the state juvenile detention center for five years deserved due process
protection, a child faced with the loss of perhaps the only "parents" he knows, and the possibility of
being moved from what he feels to be his "home" to someplace strange for the rest of his minority, is
at least equally deserving of due process protection.
212. Stuart N. Hart & Maria R. Brassard, A Major Threat to Children's Mental Health, Psycho-
logical Maltreatment, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Feb. 1987, at 160.
[Vol. 67:1077
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
ment theory, the practice in parental rights jurisdictions of removing
children from the adults with whom they are emotionally bonded and
giving them to biological parents whom they may not even know or at
least not view as attachment figures, with no consideration of the welfare
of the child, would seem to fall into this definition of psychological mal-
treatment. Most states permit removal of a child from a home if the
child is a victim of psychological maltreatment, 21 3 but, courts in parental
rights jurisdictions make decisions which have the effect of psychological
maltreatment.
"A positive ideology of children as valuable in their own right rather
than in the manner in which they meet the needs of caretakers is essential
to providing for the welfare of children. '214 This ideology is singularly
lacking where a child can be permanently removed from his or her home,
without consideration of the socio-emotional cost to that child, in re-
sponse to the perceived rights of a biological parent. It is in society's
interest to promote the welfare of children.
Children are ever the future of society. Every child who does not func-
tion at a level commensurate with his or her possibilities, every child
who is destined to make fewer contributions to society than society
needs, and every child who does not take his or her place as a produc-
tive adult diminishes the power of that society's future.215
213. Gary B. Melton & Howard A. Davidson, Child Protection and Society: When Should the
State Intervene?, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Feb. 1987, at 172.
214. Hart & Brassard, supra note 212, at 163.
215. Frances D. Horowitz & Marion O'Brian, In the Interest of the Nation: A Reflective Essay on
the State of Our Knowledge and the Challenges Before Us, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Feb. 1989, at 441,
445.
19911

